14 research outputs found
Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks
Several studies (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007) demonstrated that children younger than 3years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others' actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called "Developmental Paradoxâ. De Bruin and KĂ€stner (2012) recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the "cognitive gapâ, i.e. to provide us with a convincing account of how low-level sensorimotor practices transform into higher-order representational skills. This paper defends, against De Bruin and KĂ€stner, an enactive response to the Developmental Paradox. I argue that 3-year olds' failure to verbally report their false-belief understanding does not arise from stronger decoupling demands. Rather, they fail because the elicited response false-belief trials involve representational decoupling tout court and what is more, under pressure
Hanging in there: Prenatal origins of antigravity homeostasis in humans
All life on Earth must find a way to manage the continuous perturbation of
gravity. From birth, and even before, humans exhibit effortful antigravity work
to enact bodily, postural and behavioural form despite gravity. Indeed,
observable antigravity behaviour is a standard diagnostic indicator of neonatal
sensorimotor health. Antigravity behaviour has been investigated extensively in
its biomechanical details. Yet its motivational structure has not been a focus
of research. What drives the human body to expend energy on this effortful
behaviour? It is widely understood that thermic homeostasis in humans is
organised around conserving core body temperature at a set-point of
36.5-37.5oC. There is currently no equivalent concept of a general homeostatic
set-point driving antigravity effort. In this theoretical paper, we aim to
establish such a concept. We make the case that the core developmental
set-point for human antigravity homeostasis is neutral buoyancy (gravity and
buoyant force are balanced), which is afforded to the foetus by its
approximately equi-dense amniotic fluid medium in utero. We argue that
postnatally, the general task of human antigravity balance is to emulate the
conditions of neutral buoyancy, based upon prenatal experience thereof. Our aim
in this paper is to sketch a high-level outline of a novel characterisation of
antigravity balance as conservative homeostasis, and lay out some implications
and predictions of this model, with the intention of spurring wider research
and discussion on this hitherto little explored topic.
Keywords: antigravity, posture, homeostasis, prenatal, buoyancy, density,
fetus, foetusComment: 19 pages (including references) Zero figure
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When the window cracks: transparency and the fractured self in depersonalisation
There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter the transparency of basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity to flexibly modulate and switch between the reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. Empirical evidence will be invoked in support of the idea that impaired processing of bodily signals is characteristic of the condition. We provide first-hand subjective reports describing the experience of self-detachment or fracture between an observing and an observed self. This split is compared with similar self-detachment phenomena reported in certain Buddhist-derived meditative practices. We suggest that these alterations and changes may reveal the underlying and tacit transparency that characterises the embodied and basic pre-reflective forms of self-consciousness, in the same way that a crack in a transparent glass may indicate the presence of an unnoticed window
Back to square one : the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life
Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness is, one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences arise from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan
Whatever next and close to my selfâThe transparent senses and the âsecond skinâ: implications for the case of depersonalization
In his paper âWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,â Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming ânextâ on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term ânextâ in Clark's seminal formulation must include not only the temporal dimension (i.e., what is perceived now) but also the spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived here or next-to-my-body). In this paper, we propose to focus on perceptual experiences that happen ânext,â i.e., close-to-my-body. This is because perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs has a key impact on the organism's survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences mediated by the skin and what we will call the âextended skinâ or âsecond skin,â that is, immediate objects/materials that envelop closely to our skin, namely, clothes. We propose that the skin and tactile experiences are not a mere border separating the self and world. Rather, they simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. Hence, these proximal and pervasive tactile experiences can be viewed as a âtransparent bridgeâ intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from their self, body, and the world
Zoomed out : digital media use and depersonalization experiences during the COVID-19 lockdown
Depersonalisation is a common dissociative experience characterised by distressing feelings of being detached or âestrangedâ from oneâs self and body and/or the world. The COVID-19 pandemic forcing millions of people to socially distance themselves from others and to change their lifestyle habits. We have conducted an online study of 622 participants worldwide to investigate the relationship between digital media-based activities, distal social interactions and peoplesâ sense of self during the lockdown as contrasted with before the pandemic. We found that increased use of digital media-based activities and online social e-meetings correlated with higher feelings of depersonalisation. We also found that the participants reporting higher experiences of depersonalisation, also reported enhanced vividness of negative emotions (as opposed to positive emotions). Finally, participants who reported that lockdown influenced their life to a greater extent had higher occurrences of depersonalisation experiences. Our findings may help to address key questions regarding well-being during a lockdown, in the general population. Our study points to potential risks related to overly sedentary, and hyper-digitalised lifestyle habits that may induce feelings of living in oneâs âheadâ (mind), disconnected from oneâs body, self and the world
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The detached self: investigating the effect of depersonalisation on self-bias in the visual remapping of touch
There is a growing consensus that our most fundamental sense of self is structured by the ongoing integration of sensory and motor information related to our own body. Depersonalisation (DP) is an intriguing form of altered subjective experience in which people report feelings of unreality and detachment from their sense of self. The current study used the visual remapping of touch (VRT) paradigm to explore self-bias in visualâtactile integration in non-clinical participants reporting high and low levels of depersonalisation experiences. We found that the high-DP group showed an increased overall VRT effect but a no-self-face bias, instead showing a greater VRT effect when observing the face of another person. In addition, across all participants, self-bias was negatively predicted by the occurrence of anomalous body experiences. These results indicate disrupted integration of tactile and visual representations of the bodily self in those experiencing high levels of DP and provide greater understanding of how disruptions in multisensory perception of the self may underlie the phenomenology of depersonalisation
Physicalism and qualia
RĂ©duit Ă sa plus simple expression, ce travail de recherche met face Ă face deux acteurs sâaffrontant dans un duel philosophique : le physicalisme et lâargument de la connaissance de Franck Jackson. La question clĂ© autour de laquelle sâagencera notre discussion ici est (1) Est-il vrai que « Tout est physique » ? Le coeur de la thĂšse que nous dĂ©fendons peut ĂȘtre rĂ©sumĂ© ainsi : (T) Le clivage post-platonicien (tacite) entre les formes objectivĂ©es et les formes subjectivĂ©es de la pensĂ©e, provoque des fossĂ©s explicatifs (explicites), qui sont franchis (trĂšs souvent) via des sauts conceptuels (mystĂ©rieux), intercalĂ©s entre les Ă©tapes dâune argumentation. Il sera argumentĂ© ici que la distribution actuelle des dĂ©bats sur lâaxe Ă©tats physiques (objectifs) / Ă©tats qualitatifs (subjectifs) subit une pression souterraine post-platonicienne. ConsĂ©quemment, une bonne partie de lâĂ©nergie des penseurs actuels est dĂ©pensĂ©e Ă la recherche du « bon saut » ou « crochet » conceptuel permettant dâattacher les rives du mental Ă celui du physique. Nous soutiendrons que le coeur du problĂšme ne consiste pas Ă rĂ©soudre le diffĂ©rend entre les physicalistes et les avocats des qualia, mais plutĂŽt Ă trouver la rĂ©ponse Ă la question : pourquoi en sommes-nous arrivĂ©s lĂ , i.e., Ă ce clivage sur lâaxe phĂ©nomĂ©nal/physique ?âEverything is physicalâ physicalists claim. âEverything except qualiaâ reply the defenders of the Knowledge Argument. This thesis argues that both parties to this debate are committed to a traditional picture according to which one can tacitly adopt the standpoint of an off-stage narrator, capable of distinguishing ab initio between the different items in this conceptual scenario. The main claim here is that every time we artificially introduce a sharp conceptual distinction separating these two items or levels (mental and physical), we must automatically make a sophisticated conceptual leap in order to link the first-person qualitative perspective with the external physical world. Thus the physicalism/qualia dispute is only a by-product of an extended theoretical conception of the mind/world link which entails two distinct kinds of problems: (i) structural problems (to define and determine conceptually dual items like thought/matter, reason/senses, subject/object, etc.). Such problems require us to question âhow are these items supposed to work together?â and this leads us to the second group of problems: (ii) mediation problems. The first group of problems inevitably leads to explanatory gaps; the second ends up needing to appeal to conceptual leaps in order to ensure the necessary link between two separate items. This exerts a powerful influence over the cast of our thoughts: seen from this angle, all philosophical enterprise comes down to the question of where to place the three following parameters: the world as it is, the conceptual picture which aims to represent the world as it is and the theorist-painter gifted with the ability to capture the world picture as it is. We also face the problem of finding the right mediators to assure coherence among the members of this trio, and the problem of setting the valid criteria guaranteeing the theorist-painter that what is captured on his conceptual canvas does indeed correspond to the world as it is, i.e. that he is not laboring under the delusions of an evil genie. In this thesis I argue against this way of putting things
Physicalisme et qualia (limites de la rationalité scientifique au XXe siÚcle)
RĂ©duit Ă sa plus simple expression, ce travail de recherche met face Ă face deux acteurs s affrontant dans un duel philosophique : le physicalisme et l argument de la connaissance de Franck Jackson. La question clĂ© autour de laquelle s agencera notre discussion ici est (1) Est-il vrai que Tout est physique ? Le coeur de la thĂšse que nous dĂ©fendons peut ĂȘtre rĂ©sumĂ© ainsi : (T) Le clivage post-platonicien (tacite) entre les formes objectivĂ©es et les formes subjectivĂ©es de la pensĂ©e, provoque des fossĂ©s explicatifs (explicites), qui sont franchis (trĂšs souvent) via des sauts conceptuels (mystĂ©rieux), intercalĂ©s entre les Ă©tapes d une argumentation. Il sera argumentĂ© ici que la distribution actuelle des dĂ©bats sur l axe Ă©tats physiques (objectifs) / Ă©tats qualitatifs (subjectifs) subit une pression souterraine post-platonicienne. ConsĂ©quemment, une bonne partie de l Ă©nergie des penseurs actuels est dĂ©pensĂ©e Ă la recherche du bon saut ou crochet conceptuel permettant d attacher les rives du mental Ă celui du physique. Nous soutiendrons que le coeur du problĂšme ne consiste pas Ă rĂ©soudre le diffĂ©rend entre les physicalistes et les avocats des qualia, mais plutĂŽt Ă trouver la rĂ©ponse Ă la question : pourquoi en sommes-nous arrivĂ©s lĂ , i.e., Ă ce clivage sur l axe phĂ©nomĂ©nal/physique ?Everything is physical physicalists claim. Everything except qualia reply the defenders of the Knowledge Argument. This thesis argues that both parties to this debate are committed to a traditional picture according to which one can tacitly adopt the standpoint of an off-stage narrator, capable of distinguishing ab initio between the different items in this conceptual scenario. The main claim here is that every time we artificially introduce a sharp conceptual distinction separating these two items or levels (mental and physical), we must automatically make a sophisticated conceptual leap in order to link the first-person qualitative perspective with the external physical world. Thus the physicalism/qualia dispute is only a by-product of an extended theoretical conception of the mind/world link which entails two distinct kinds of problems: (i) structural problems (to define and determine conceptually dual items like thought/matter, reason/senses, subject/object, etc.). Such problems require us to question how are these items supposed to work together? and this leads us to the second group of problems: (ii) mediation problems. The first group of problems inevitably leads to explanatory gaps; the second ends up needing to appeal to conceptual leaps in order to ensure the necessary link between two separate items. This exerts a powerful influence over the cast of our thoughts: seen from this angle, all philosophical enterprise comes down to the question of where to place the three following parameters: the world as it is, the conceptual picture which aims to represent the world as it is and the theorist-painter gifted with the ability to capture the world picture as it is. We also face the problem of finding the right mediators to assure coherence among the members of this trio, and the problem of setting the valid criteria guaranteeing the theorist-painter that what is captured on his conceptual canvas does indeed correspond to the world as it is, i.e. that he is not laboring under the delusions of an evil genie. In this thesis I argue against this way of putting things.DIJON-BU Droit Lettres (212312101) / SudocSudocFranceF